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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study the invariance of the Core of ordinal many-to-one
matching problems with respect to changes on rms preference relations on subsets of
workers. An ordinal many-to-one matching problem (amatching problem for short) consists
of two non-empty and disjoint sets of agents: the set of rms (or institutions like schools,
colleges, hospitals, etc.) and the set of workers (or individuals like children, students,
medical interns, etc.). An allocation for a matching problem is a matching among rms
and workers with the property that each worker can be matched to at most one rm and
each rm is matched to a (possibly empty) subset of workers, keeping the bilateral nature
of the relationships in the sense that if a worker is matched to a rm this rm is matched
to a subset of workers that contains this worker. Each worker has a strict preference
relation on the set of rms plus the prospect of remaining unmatched. Each rm has a
strict preference relation on the set of all subsets of workers. A preference prole is a list
of preference relations, one for each agent. The Core of a matching problem (at a given
preference prole) is the set of matchings that are not blocked; namely, a matching belongs
to the Core if there is no subset of agents (a coalition of rms and workers) such that, by
rematching only among themselves, each agent gets a weakly better partner and at least
one of them gets a strictly better one.
The rst result of the paper (Theorem 1) characterizes the family of equivalence classes
of preference relations of each rm with the property that two preference relations are in
the same class if and only if they have the same Core for all preference relations of the
remaining agents. Our invariance result in Theorem 1 identies those orderings between
pairs of subsets of workers in a preference relation of a rm that, if inverted, the Core
remains unchanged for all possible preference relations of the other agents. In other words,
Theorem 1 identies irrelevant changes on a preference relation of a rm that leave the Core
invariant, irrespectively of the other agentspreference relations. The way of proceeding
with this identication is as follows. Take a preference relation of a rm. First, construct
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the family of individually rational subsets of workers (a set of workers S belong to the
family if and only if the rm prefers the set S to all of its strict subsets). Second, dene
a binary relation on this family as follows: given two subsets of workers S and S 0 in the
family declare that S is preferred to S 0 (according to the binary relation) if and only if S
is the best subset (according to the original and complete preference relation of the rm)
among all subsets of S [ S 0; otherwise, the two subsets of workers are left unordered by
the binary relation. Observe that in general this binary relation is not only dened on
a subfamily of subsets of workers but it is also incomplete. It turns out that this binary
relation can be used as the representative of one equivalence class of preference relations
of the rm because all preference relations that share the same binary relation constructed
as we just described have the property that the Core is the same regardless of the other
agentspreference relations.
Theorem 1 extends and generalizes our previous result in Martínez, Massó, Neme, and
Oviedo (2008) where we construct this invariant partition only for the subclass of substi-
tutable preference proles.1 If the preference prole is substitutable the Core and the set
of stable matchings coincide, are non-empty, and the binary relations obtained from the
preference relations of the rms, as we have described above, are partial orders.
In general, the binary relation used to represent the equivalence class formed by all
preference relations of a rm that leave the Core invariant still relates too many pairs of
subsets of workers. In centralized matching markets in which Core mechanisms (stable ones,
whenever rmspreferences are substitutable) are used to suggest to the participants  after
collecting and processing their preference relations  a matching in the Core, it would be
very useful to use the smallest possible amount of information contained in the preference
prole that still allows to compute a Core matching relative to this preference prole.2
1A preference relation of a rm is substitutable if the desirability of a worker w in a particular set of
workers does not come from the presence of another worker w0 in that set because the rm still wants to hire
worker w even when worker w0 is not available anymore; i.e., substitutable preference relations do not exhibit
strong complementarities among workers. A preference prole is substitutable if the preference relations of
all rms are substitutable. Kelso and Crawford (1982) were the rst to dene and use substitutability in a
more general matching model with money.
2See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a general description and analysis of these centralized markets.
Niederle, Roth, and Sönmez (2008) contains a recent overview on matching and market design in general.
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Thus, and in order to identify this minimal amount of information, we give a procedure to
construct the minimal binary relation contained in the binary relation identied in Theorem
1, with the property that it still can generate all preference relations in the same equivalence
class (that is, with the same Core) as their strict extensions. Furthermore, this binary
relation is minimal in the sense that any strictly weaker (i.e., strictly contained) binary
relation has at least two strict extensions that belong to di¤erent equivalence classes and
thus have di¤erent Cores for some preference relations of the other agents.
Observe that the question of nding the minimal binary relation that can generate
all equivalent preference relations was not even asked in Martínez, Massó, Neme, and
Oviedo (2008) for the subclass of substitutable preference relations. Thus, the marginal
contribution of this paper in relation to our former one is two-fold. We rst extend the result
of Theorem 1 from substitutable preference relations to any preference relation. Second,
we identify for each preference relation (substitutable or not) the minimal binary relation
that can be used as the representative of each equivalence class of preference relations with
an invariant Core. This binary relation contains the indispensable and, at the same time,
minimal information to generate the full class.
Echenique (2008) answers a related question. Suppose we observe a set of matchings
and we do not know agentspreference relations. Are there preference relations for the
agents so that the observed set of matchings are stable?3 If yes, the set of matchings is
said to be rationalizable. Echenique (2008) rst shows that there are sets of matchings that
are not rationalizable (and thus, the theory is testable) and second he identies conditions
that characterize the sets of matchings that are rationalizable: a necessary condition is
that a certain graph has no odd cycles and a necessary and su¢ cient condition is in terms
of no odd cycles and a certain system of polynomial inequalities. However, his results
are di¤erent from ours in many respects. Echenique (2008)s results apply only to the
one-to-one matching model while ours apply to the more general many-to-one matching
model. His results are in graph-theoretical terms and deal with the full preference prole
by identifying how agents can rank potential partners given the set of matchings to be
rationalizable. In contrast we identify, given a preference relation of a rm over subsets of
workers (and independently of the other agentspreferences), those relations between pairs
3Chambers and Echenique (2008) ask a similar question for a cardinal matching model.
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of subsets of workers that are critical from the point of view of the Core and those that are
not.
Before nishing this Introduction we want to emphasize that, besides their intrinsic
interest, our invariance and minimality results have a relevant informational implication.
They show that the amount of information about rmspreferences required to compute the
set of Core matchings may be signicantly smaller than the amount needed to describe their
complete preference relations. This may be specially relevant for running direct preference
revelation Core mechanisms in centralized entry-level professional labor markets. Moreover,
our results may have computational and behavioral implications since they may simplify
the task of computing the set of Core matchings as well as the analysis of the strategic
behavior induced on rms by centralized Core matching mechanisms (in particular, to nd
either best-replies or unilateral deviations may be substantially easier). Finally, our results
can be straightforwardly extended to the Core of ordinal many-to-many matching markets.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the notation, the basic
denitions, and some preliminary results. In Section 3 we state and prove the invariance
result for the set of Core matchings. In Section 4 we dene the notions of minimal binary
relation, strict extension and state and prove the minimality result. Finally, in Section 5 we
conclude with nal remarks, including a very preliminarily analysis of the computational
aspect of our approach.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Agents and Preferences
Let W be the set of workers and let F be the set of rms. We assume that W and F
are nite and disjoint. The set of agents is W [ F . Each worker w 2 W has a preference
relation Pw on the set of rms plus the prospect of remaining unemployed. We assume
that Pw is strict. Specically, Pw is a complete, irreexive, and transitive binary relation
on F [ f?g, where ? means that w is not hired by any rm.4 Given Pw; let Rw be the
4A binary relation  on X is (i) complete if for all x; y 2 X such that x 6= y, either x  y or y  x (ii)
irreexive if x  x for all x 2 X and (iii) transitive if for all x; y; z 2 X such that x  y  z; x  z holds.
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weak preference relation on F [ f?g induced by Pw as follows: for f; f 0 2 F [ f?g; fRwf 0
if and only if either f = f 0 or fPwf 0. Then, Rw is a complete, reexive, antisymmetric,
and transitive binary relation on F [ f?g:5 Each rm f 2 F has a preference relation
Pf on the family of all subsets of workers. We assume that Pf is strict. Specically, Pf
is a complete, irreexive, and transitive binary relation on 2W ; where the empty set is
interpreted as the prospect of not hiring any worker. Given rm fs preference relation Pf
and a subset of workers S, Ch(S; Pf ) denotes fs most-preferred subset of S according to
Pf . Generically, we will refer to this set as the choice set. Given Pf , let Rf be the complete,
reexive, antisymmetric, and transitive binary relation induced similarly on 2W by Pf . A
preference prole P = ((Pf )f2F ; (Pw)w2W ) is a jF j+ jW j  tuple of preference relations, one
for each agent. Given a preference prole P and fs preference relation P 0f , we will denote
by (P 0f ; P f ) the original preference prole P after replacing Pf by P
0
f and refer to P f
as a subprole. Given a preference relation Pf of rm f , the subsets of workers preferred
to the empty set by f are called acceptable. Similarly, given a preference relation Pw of
worker w, the rms preferred to the empty set by w are called acceptable. By convention,
we declare the empty set as being acceptable for all agents. Since the set of agents will be
xed throughout the paper, we identify a matching problem with a preference prole P .
2.2 Matchings and the Core
A matching assigns each rm to a subset of workers (possibly empty) and each worker to
at most one rm, keeping the bilateral nature of the relationship; i.e., worker w works for
rm f if and only if rm f hires worker w.
Denition 1 A matching is a mapping  : W [ F  ! 2F[W with the properties:
(ma.1) (f) 2 2W for all f 2 F ;
(ma.2) (w) 2 2F and j(w)j  1 for all w 2 W ; and
(ma.3) w 2 (f) if and only if (w) = f .6
5A binary relation  on X is (i) reexive if x  x for all x 2 X and (ii) antisymmetric if, for all x; y 2 X
such that x  y and y  x, x = y holds:
6With a slight abuse of notation we treat (w) 6= ? as an element of F instead of one of its subsets; for
instance, we write (w) = f instead of (w) = ffg:
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If matching is voluntary it should be immune to any secession of a coalition of agents
that, by matching only amongst themselves, could obtain better partners by breaking the
former partnerships and creating new ones (a block). The Core is the set of matchings that
are not blocked by any coalition of agents.
Denition 2 Let P be a preference prole and let  be a matching. Coalition W 0[F 0 
W [ F blocks  if there exists another matching 0 such that:
(bl.1) 0(f)  W 0 for all f 2 F 0;
(bl.2) either 0(w) = ? or 0(w) 2 F 0 for all w 2 W 0; and
(bl.3) for all f 2 F 0;
0(f)Rf(f); (1)
for all w 2 W 0,
0(w)Rw(w); (2)
and at least one of the weak preferences in (1) and (2) is strict.
Denition 3 Let P be a preference prole. A matching  belongs to the Core (at P ) if
it is not blocked by any coalition.
A matching  is individually rational (at P ) if (w)Rw? for all w 2 W and (f) =
Ch((f); Pf ) for all f 2 F . Denote by IR(P ) the set of individually rational matchings at
P . A matching  is pair-wise stable (at P ) if there is no unmatched pair (w; f) 2 W  F
such that fPw(w) and w 2 Ch((f)[ fwg; Pf ). The set of stable matchings (at P ) is the
set of individually rational matchings that are pair-wise stable. Let S(P ) denote the set
of stable matchings (at P ) and let C(P ) denote the set of matchings in the Core (at P ).
Obviously, C(P )  S(P ) for all P . It is well-known that there are preference proles for
which the Core (and the set of stable matchings) is empty.
Kelso and Crawford (1982) proposed (in a more general many-to-one matching model) a
condition on the preference relations of rms, called substitutability, with the property that
if in a prole P all rms have substitutable preference relations then the Core is non-empty
and coincides with the set of stable matchings. For this reason substitutability has played
a central role in the analysis of many-to-one matching models.
Denition 4 A rm fs preference relation Pf satises substitutability if for any set S
containing workers w and w0 (w 6= w0), if w 2 Ch (S; Pf ) then w 2 Ch (Sn fw0g ; Pf ).
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Substitutability precludes strong complementarities among workers since it requires that
the desirability of a worker w in a particular set S does not come exclusively from the
presence of another worker w0 in that set; i.e., the rm still wants to hire worker w even
though worker w0 is not available anymore; thus, w is a good worker (in the context of the set
S) not only because of the presence of w0: A preference prole P is substitutable if for each
rm f , the preference relation Pf satises substitutability. Let S be the set of substitutable
preference proles. For any substitutable preference prole P 2 S, C(P ) = S (P ) 6= ?:
However, there are non substitutable preference proles P for which C(P ) 6= ?:
2.3 Extracting Binary Relations from FirmsPreferences
Consider a preference relation of a rm on the family of all subsets of workers. Our objective
is to distinguish among all orderings between pairs of subsets of workers those that are
irrelevant for the Core from those that are relevant in the following sense. Take S and S 0
and assume that SPfS 0: Consider a new preference relation P 0f with the property that it
coincides with Pf except that S 0P 0fS: Then either C(Pf ; P f ) = C(P
0
f ; P f ) for all P f (in
which case the ordering between S and S 0 is irrelevant for the Core) or else there exists at
least one P 0 f such that C(Pf ; P
0
 f ) 6= C(P 0f ; P 0 f ) (in which case the ordering is relevant).
To attain this objective we proceed by rst selecting from the family of all subsets of
workers a subfamily on which we will then dene a binary relation that keeps only the
relevant orderings (from the point of view of the Core) between subsets of workers. But
before, we need some additional notions and notation.
Let A be a non-empty subfamily of subsets ofW containing the empty set; i.e., A  2W
and ? 2 A. A partial order  on A is a reexive, transitive, and antisymmetric binary
relation on A. Observe that weak preference relations of rms are complete partial orders
on 2W . Given a binary relation  on A; let  be the antireexive and transitive binary
relation on A induced by  on A as follows: for S; S 0 2 A, S  S 0 if and only if S  S 0
and S 6= S 0. A binary relation  on A is acyclic if for all S1; :::; Sk 2 A such that S1 6= Sk,
S1  :::  Sk implies Sk  S1. A binary relation  on A has a maximal element on B  A
if there exists S 2 B such that for all S 0 2 B with S 0 6= S, S  S 0 holds where  is induced
by . Then, given a preference relation Pf and a set S 2 2W , Pf has a maximal element
on the family of all subsets of S: We have denoted this set by Ch(S; Pf ) and called it the
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choice set of S according to Pf ; namely, Ch(S; Pf )PfS 0 for all S 0 2 2SnCh(S; Pf ):
It will be useful to understand (and to denote) a binary relation  on A as a subset of
A  A; namely, for all S; T 2 A; (S; T ) 2 A  A if and only if S  T: Hence, for two
binary relations  and 0 on A the notation 0 means that if S; S 0 2 A and S  S 0
then, S 0 S 0.
After these preliminaries we now turn to dene the procedure to delete from the pref-
erence relation of a rm the orderings between those pairs of subsets of workers that are
irrelevant with respect to the set of matchings in the Core. First, subsets that are not the
choice set of themselves can be left unordered since no matching in the Core, regardless
of the other agentspreference relations, matches this rm with any of these subsets. For-
mally, given the preference relation Pf on 2W , dene the family APf of individually rational
subsets of workers relative to Pf as the collection of sets that are choice sets of themselves;
that is,
APf = fS 2 2W j S = Ch(S; Pf )g:
Second, some pairs of subsets of workers in APf will be left unordered. Specically,
dene the binary relation Pf on APf obtained from Pf as follows: for all S; S 0 2 APf ;
S Pf S 0 if and only if S = Ch(S [ S 0; Pf ):
Again, the binary relation Pf on APf leaves as unordered (i) all sets in 2W that are
not the choice of themselves and (ii) those pairs of sets in APf whose union contains a
set that is preferred to each of the two sets.7 Martínez, Massó, Neme, and Oviedo (2008)
show that if Pf is substitutable then Pf is a partial order on APf and (APf ;Pf ) is a
semilattice; namely, for every S; S 0 2 APf , lubPf fS; S 0g 2 APf (where, given a family of
subsets T , lubPf T is the least upper bound of T ). Example 1 below shows that if Pf is
not substitutable then the binary relation Pf may not be transitive.
Example 1 Let W = fw1; w2; w3; w4; w5g be the set of workers and let f be a rm.
Consider the preference relation
Pf : fw1; w5g; fw1; w2g; fw3; w4g; fw4; w5g; f?g;
7Blair (1988) was the rst to use this binary relation when showing that the set of stable matchings
with multiple partners has a lattice structure.
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where we only list acceptable subsets of workers in decreasing order of preference. Observe
that Pf is not substitutable since w5 2 Ch(W;Pf ) and w5 =2 Ch(Wnfw1g; Pf ) = fw3; w4g:
Moreover, the family of individually rational subsets of workers relative to Pf is APf =
ffw1; w5g; fw1; w2g; fw3; w4g; fw4; w5g; f?gg and
fw1; w2g = Ch (fw1; w2g [ fw3; w4g; Pf ) ;
fw3; w4g = Ch (fw3; w4g [ fw4; w5g; Pf ) ; and
fw1; w5g = Ch (fw1; w2g [ fw4; w5g; Pf ) :
Hence, fw1; w2g Pf fw3; w4g Pf fw4; w5g but fw1; w2g Pf fw4; w5g: Thus, the binary
relation Pf is not transitive and (APf ;Pf ) is not a semilattice. 
Example 1 shows that the binary relationPf may be incomplete onAPf (both fw1; w2g Pf
fw4; w5g and fw4; w5g Pf fw1; w2g hold) and that it may not inherit the transitivity of Pf :
Nevertheless, Remarks 1 and 2 below establish that the binary relation Pf inherit some
other properties from the preference relation Pf .
Remark 1 Let S; S 0 2 APf be such that S Pf S 0: Then, SRfS 0:
Remark 2 The binary relation Pf on APf is reexive, antisymmetric, acyclic, and has
a maximal element on APf .
3 The Invariance Result
Theorem 1 below gives a simple procedure to partition the set of rm fs preference relations
into equivalence classes where each class contains exactly those preference relations for
which the set of Core matchings is invariant regardless of the other agents preference
relations. Theorem 1 says that an equivalence class is composed of all rm fs preference
relations for which the binary relation obtained from them coincide.
Theorem 1 Let Pf and P 0f be two preference relations on 2
W . Then,
Pf=P 0f if and only if C(Pf ; P f ) = C(P 0f ; P f ) for all P f .
Proof ( )) Let Pf and P 0f be two preference relations such that Pf=P 0f . Thus,
APf = AP 0f . Assume there exist P f and  such that  2 C(Pf ; P f )nC(P 0f ; P f ): Since
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APf = AP 0f and  2 C(Pf ; P f );  (f) 2 APf = AP 0f ; i.e.,  (f) = Ch
 
 (f) ; P 0f

: Thus,
 2 IR(Pf ; P f ) \ IR(P 0f ; P f ): (3)
Dene P 0 = (P 0f ; P f ) and let (F
0;W 0; 0) be a block of  at P 0. By (3), there exist f 0 2 F 0
and S 0  W 0 such that 0(f 0) = S 0 and for all v 2 ff 0g [ S 0,
0(v)R0v(v); (4)
and there exists v 2 ff 0g [ S 0 such that
0(v)P 0v(v): (5)
If f 0 6= f; by (4) and (5), 0(v)Rv(v) and 0(v)Pv(v): Hence (ff 0g; S 0; 0) blocks  at
(Pf ; P f ). This contradicts the hypothesis that  2 C(Pf ; P f ): Thus, f 0 = f: Hence
(ffg; 0(f); 0) blocks  at P 0: If 0(f) 6= Ch  0(f); P 0f then (ffg; Ch  0(f); P 0f ; 00)
also blocks  at P; where 00 is such that 00(f) = Ch
 
0(f); P 0f

and 00(f^) = ? for
all f^ 6= f: Hence, and since APf = AP 0f ; we can assume without loss of generality that
0(f) = Ch
 
0(f); P 0f

= Ch (0(f); Pf ) : Since  2 C(Pf ; P f ),
(f)Pf
0(f) and 0(f)P 0f(f):
Thus,
0(f) Pf (f) and (f) P 0f 
0(f): (6)
By the hypothesis that Pf=P 0f ;
0(f) P 0f (f) and (f) Pf 
0(f): (7)
Consider any matching ^ with the property that ^(f) = Ch ( (f) [ 0 (f) ; Pf ). We now
show that, (ffg; Ch ( (f) [ 0 (f) ; Pf ) ; ^) blocks  at (Pf ; P f ): Since (7) we have that
^(f)Pf(f): Let w 2 ^(f): Either w 2 (f), in which case w 2 S 0 and ^(w)Rw(w) since
^(w) = (w) or else, w 2 0(f), in which case ^(w) = f = 0(w)Rw(w) by (4) and
Rw = R
0
w: This contradicts the hypothesis that  2 C(Pf ; P f ):
(() Let Pf and P 0f be such that C(Pf ; P f ) = C(P 0f ; P f ) for all P f . We rst show
that APf = AP 0f . Assume S 2 APf : We want to show that S 2 AP 0f (by symmetry, this will
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su¢ ce). Consider the following subprole P f : for all w 2 S, all w0 =2 S; and all f^ 6= f ,
Pw Pw0 Pf^
f ? ?
?:
The unique core matching at (Pf ; P f ) is ; where (f) = S and (f^) = ? for all f^ 6= f
(obviously, (w0) = ? for all w0 =2 S): By hypothesis, C(Pf ; P f ) = C(P 0f ; P f ): Hence,
 is individually rational at (P 0f ; P f ): Thus, S 2 AP 0f . To show that Pf=P 0f assume
S1; S2 2 APf = AP 0f are such that S1 Pf S2; but S1 P 0f S2. Then,
S1 6= Ch
 
S1 [ S2; P 0f

Consider the following preference prole P f : for all w 2 S1 [ S2, all w0 =2 S1 [ S2; and all
f^ 6= f ,
Pw Pw0 Pf^
f ? ?
?:
Let  be the matching where (f) = S1; (f^) = ? for all f^ 6= f; and (w0) = ? for all w0 =2
S1: Since S1 Pf S2, S1 = Ch(S1 [ S2; Pf ): It is easy to check that  2 C(Pf ; P f ): Since
S1 6= Ch
 
S1 [ S2; P 0f

, Ch
 
S1 [ S2; P 0f

P 0fS1. Thus, (ffg; Ch
 
S1 [ S2; P 0f

; 0), where 0
is any matching such that 0(f) = Ch
 
S1 [ S2; P 0f

, blocks  at (P 0f ; P f ) since
0(f)P 0f(f) = S1;
and for all w 2 Ch  S1 [ S2; P 0f ;
f = 0(w)Rw(w):
Hence,  =2 C(P 0f ; P f ): This contradicts the hypothesis that C(Pf ; P f ) = C(P 0f ; P f ). 
An alternative way of describing Theorem 1 in terms of the Core correspondence is as
follows. For a rm f and its preference relation Pf denote by Tf;Pf the Core mapping that
takes as arguments all subproles of preferences P f of workers and remaining rms and
such that Tf;Pf (P f ) = C(Pf ; P f ): Theorem 1 partitions the set of preference relations of
rm f into equivalence classes such that all preference relations in a class have the same
Core mapping.
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4 The Minimality Result
An implication of Theorem 1 is that an incomplete binary relation can be used as the
representative of each equivalence class of all preference relations of a rm that leave the
Core invariant. In general, the amount of information contained in the incomplete binary
relation is substantially smaller than the one contained in any of its associated preference
relations. However, this binary relation still contains redundant information (some pairs
of subsets of workers are unnecessarily ordered) since the same equivalence class could be
recovered by extending appropriately a strictly weaker binary relation. Example 2 below
illustrates this fact and how we will proceed.
Example 2 Let W = fw1; w2; w3g be the set of workers and let f be a rm. Consider
the preference relation Pf on 2W
fw1; w2; w3gPffw1; w2gPffw1; w3gPffw2; w3gPffw1gPffw2gPffw3gPff?g:
Observe that APf = 2
W . Obviously, S Pf S for all S 2 APf . In addition, Pf consists of
the following orderings:
fw1; w2; w3g Pf fw1; w2g fw1; w2g Pf fw1g fw1g Pf f?g
fw1; w2; w3g Pf fw1; w3g fw1; w2g Pf fw2g fw2g Pf f?g
fw1; w2; w3g Pf fw2; w3g fw1; w2g Pf f?g fw3g Pf f?g:
fw1; w2; w3g Pf fw1g fw1; w3g Pf fw1g
fw1; w2; w3g Pf fw2g fw1; w3g Pf fw3g
fw1; w2; w3g Pf fw3g fw1; w3g Pf f?g
fw1; w2; w3g Pf f?g fw2; w3g Pf fw2g
fw2; w3g Pf fw3g
fw2; w3g Pf f?g
Note that fw1; w2gPffw1; w3g, fw1; w2gPffw2; w3g; and fw1; w3gPffw2; w3g but fw1; w2g Pf
fw1; w3g, fw1; w2g Pf fw2; w3g; and fw1; w3g Pf fw2; w3g because fw1; w2; w3g =
Ch(fw1; w2g [ fw1; w3g; Pf ) = Ch(fw1; w2g [ fw2; w3g; Pf ) = Ch(fw1; w3g [ fw2; w3g; Pf ).
From the point of view of the Core, the only relevant information contained in Pf (together
with the fact that APf = 2
W ) is that the best subset of workers is W itself (this is true as
long as we extend the binary relation by making sure that if one set of workers is strictly
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contained in another set then, the larger set is strictly preferred to the smaller one in the
extension). The relative orderings among subsets of cardinality two and the relative or-
derings among subsets of cardinality one are irrelevant for the set of Core matchings. For
instance, in this case the three preference relations P 0f , P
00
f ; and P
000
f dened by
fw1; w2; w3gP 0ffw1; w2gP 0ffw2; w3gP 0ffw1; w3gP 0ffw1gP 0ffw2gP 0ffw3gP 0ff?g
fw1; w2; w3gP 00f fw1; w2gP 00f fw1; w3gP 00f fw2; w3gP 00f fw2gP 00f fw1gP 00f fw3gP 00f f?g
fw1; w2; w3gP 000f fw1; w2gP 000f fw2; w3gP 000f fw1; w3gP 000f fw2gP 000f fw1gP 000f fw3gP 000f f?g
have the property that C(Pf ; P f ) = C(P 0f ; P f ) = C(P
00
f ; P f ) = C(P
000
f ; P f ) for any
subprole P f : Indeed, we will show that from the information conveyed by the fact that
APf = 2
W and the much weaker (and minimal) binary relation mPf= f?g, where no pair of
subsets of workers are related, we will be able to extract the class of (complete) preference
relations on 2W that leave the Core invariant. Observe that the number of pairs related
by Pf (nineteen or twenty seven if we include those that follow from reexivity) is much
larger than the number of pairs related by mPf (none). But this is an extreme case.
Consider now the preference relation P^f on 2W
fw1; w2gP^ffw1gP^ffw2gP^ffw3gP^ff?g,
where we only list acceptable partners. Then, AP^f = ffw1; w2g; fw1g; fw2g; fw3g; f?gg
and fw1; w2g P^f fw1g, fw1; w2g P^f fw2g, fw1; w2g P^f fw3g, fw1g P^f fw3g, fw2g P^f
fw3g, and for any S 2 AP^f ; S P^f S and S P^f f?g. Observe rst that fw1g P^f fw2g and
fw2g P^f fw1g, and that the orderings fw1; w2g P^f fw3g and fw1; w2g P^f f?g could be
recovered by transitivity (using either fw1g or fw2g as intermediate subset). In addition,
the orderings fw1; w2g P^f fw1g; fw1; w2g P^f fw2g and for any S 2 AP^f ; S P^f S
and S P^f f?g could also be recovered because they relate a set with one of its subsets.
Thus, we could dene a much weaker binary relation m
P^f
on AP^f with only two elements:
fw1g mP^f fw3g and fw2g 
m
P^f
fw3g. Moreover, given AP^f (this conveys a very important
information), the two preference relations P^f (the one that we started with) and Pf on 2W
(again, we only list acceptable partners)
fw1; w2gP^ffw1gP^ffw2gP^ffw3gP^ff?g
fw1; w2g Pffw2g Pffw1g Pffw3g Pff?g
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can be obtained from m
P^f
as what we will call strict extensions. Our results will say that
C(P^f ; P f ) = C( Pf ; P f ) for all subproles P f . On the other hand, if we had left the
two subsets fw1g and fw3g unordered we could have found two strict extensions Pf and ~Pf
with the property that C( Pf ; P f ) 6= C( ~Pf ; P f ) for some subprole P f ; in this sense the
binary relation m
P^f
on AP^f will be called minimal. 
In the sequel we dene a minimal binary relation that will declare as unordered (i) any
two subsets of workers with the property that one is a strict subset of the other and (ii) any
two subsets of workers whose relative ordering (for instance, S Pf S 00) could be obtained
by transitivity (i.e., S and S 00 will be left unordered whenever there exists S 0 2 APf such
that S Pf S 0 Pf S 00).
In this section we identify the minimal binary relation (weaker than the one used as the
representative of the class) with the following two properties: (i) all preference relations
in the class can be obtained from this minimal binary relation by what we call a strict
extension, and (ii) any strictly weaker binary relation has at least two strict extensions that
belong to two di¤erent equivalence classes.
4.1 Transitive Closure
To make the proof of Theorem 2 below simpler, we will now rst enlarge Pf with its
transitive closure TPf and then reduce it by identifying a minimal binary relation mPf so
that mPfPfTPf :
Denition 5 Let  be an acyclic binary relation on A. The binary relation T on A is
the transitive closure of  if it is the smallest transitive binary relation on A that contains
.
Notice that the all-relation on A  A is transitive and contains all binary relations on
A. The intersection of transitive binary relations on A is again transitive; that is, given ,
T= \f0 A  A j0 and 0 is transitiveg is transitive. Finally, let  be an acyclic
binary relation on A. Then, T= [n2N n, where S n S 0 if there exist S1; :::; Sn 2 A such
that S = S1      Sn = S 0.8
Before proceeding we state and prove a Lemma that will be useful in the sequel.
8See Harzheim (2005).
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Lemma 1 Let Pf be a preference relation on 2W and assume that S1; S2 2 APf ; S1 TPf
S2; and S1  S2: Then, S1 = S2:
Proof Since S1  S2 and S2 2 APf ; Ch (S1 [ S2; Pf ) = Ch (S2; Pf ) = S2: Hence, S2 Pf
S1 and S2 TPf S1: By hypothesis, S1 TPf S2. By Proposition 1, Pf is antisymmetric. By
its denition, TPf is antisymmetric as well. Thus, S1 = S2: 
4.2 Minimal Binary Relation
To identify the minimal binary relation associated to the preference relation Pf of rm f
we proceed as follows. First, obtain APf . Second, compute Pf and its transitive closure
TPf . Then, delete from TPf all ordered pairs of subsets of workers that (i) are related by
inclusion and (ii) are related as the consequence of the transitivity of TPf . Formally,
Denition 6 Let Pf be a preference relation on 2W . The binary relation TPf on APf
is minimal if for all S; S 0 2 APf such that S TPf S 0 the following condition holds:
(mi) S  S 0 if and only if S \ S 0 =2 fS; S 0g and there does not exist S 00 2 APfn fS; S 0g such
that; S TPf S 00 TPf S 0.
Given Pf , there is a unique minimal binary relation on APf : Denote it by mPf : Next
lemma states that mPf is not only weaker than TPf but it is also weaker than the original
Pf .
Lemma 2 Let Pf be a preference relation on 2W . Then, mPfPf :
Proof To obtain a contradiction assume mPf*Pf ; namely, there exist S; S 0 2 APf such
that S mPf S 0 and S Pf S 0: Since, by Remark 2, Pf is reexive, S 6= S 0. Observe that
mPfTPf and S mPf S 0 imply S TPf S 0. Since S Pf S 0 and S TPf S 0, by denition of
TPf there exists S1; :::; Sn 2 APf such that S 6= S1 6=    6= Sn 6= S 0 and S Pf S1 Pf
   Pf Sn Pf S 0. Since TPf is transitive by denition, this implies that S TPf S1 TPf S 0.
By (mi) in Denition 6, S mPf S
0; a contradiction. 
Alternatively, we could directly dene mPfPf replacing condition (mi) in Denition
6 above by
(mi) S  S 0 if and only if S \S 0 =2 fS; S 0g and there does not exist S 00 2 APfn fS; S 0g such
that; S Pf S 00 Pf S 0.
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However, the arguments would become more involved since instead of using the transitivity
of TPf we should use the acyclicity of Pf by identifying (and working with) sequences
S1 Pf    Pf Sk with the property that Sk Pf S1.
4.3 Strict Extension
We next give a procedure to obtain from the minimal binary relation all preference relations
that would generate it. The procedure consists of completing the acyclic minimal binary
relation by declaring a set in the family to be (strictly) preferred to all its subsets and if a
set is not in the family of individually rational subsets of workers then it must have a strict
subset that belongs to the family and is strictly preferred to it. Formally,
Denition 7 Let  be an acyclic binary relation on A  2W with ? 2 A. The (strict)
preference relation P f on 2W is a strict extension of  if for all S 0; S 00 2 A such that
S 0 6= S 00 :
(se.1) if S 0  S 00 then, S 0P fS 00;
(se.2) if S 00  S 0 then, S 0P fS 00; and
(se.3) if S =2 A then, there exists S^ 2 A such that S^  S and S^P fS:
Denition 7 can be seen as a set of instructions on how to extend an acyclic binary
relation on A to a preference relation on 2W . First, it preserves all the ordered pairs (this
corresponds to the standard notion of an extension used by Szpilrajn (1930)). Second, a
set is preferred to all its subsets. Third, if a set is not in A then, we have freedom on how
to order it but the set has to be worse than one of its subsets (perhaps the empty set).
Finally, all the remaining pairs that are not ordered by the acyclic binary relation can be
freely ordered by the preference relation (this is one of the reasons of why in general there
are many strict extensions of an acyclic binary relation). Before proceeding, we state and
prove two results: Lemma 3 will be useful in the proof of Theorem 2 below and Lemma 4
states that indeed Pf is obtained as a strict extension of mPf .
Lemma 3 Let Pf be a preference relation on 2W . Suppose P f is a strict extension of
mPf : Furthermore, assume S; S 0 2 APf ; S 6= S 0 and S TPf S 0: Then, SP fS 0:
Proof If S mPf S 0 then, by (se.1) in Denition 7, SP fS 0:
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Assume S mPf S
0: By Lemma 1, and since S TPf S 0 and S 6= S 0; S " S 0: Thus, either
S  S 0 or there exists S1 2 APf such that S TPf S1 TPf S 0: If S  S 0 then, by (se.2) in
Denition 7, SP fS 0:
Assume there exists S1 2 APf such that S1 6= S; S 0 and S TPf S1 TPf S 0; We assume
without lost of generality that S1 is maximal with respect to TPf ; i.e., there does not exist
S^ 2 A; S^ 6= S1; S; S 0 such that S TPf S^ TPf S1 TPf S 0: Observe that by Remark 2, Pf is
acyclic and hence, by Lemma 2, mPf is also acyclic. Thus, this maximal set S1 does exist.
Assume S mPf S1: Then, if there would exist S^ 2 APf such that S TPf S^ TPf S1 then,
S TPf S^ TPf S1 TPf S 0; contradicting the maximality of S1: Because S TPf S1; by (mi) in
Denition 6, either S  S1 or S1  S: Note that if S1  S; and since S TPf S1, Lemma 1
implies S = S 0: This contradicts S mPf S1 because, by Remark 2, Pf is reexive. Hence,
and since mPfTPf ; mPf is reexive as well. Thus, S  S1: By (se.2) in Denition 7, any
strict extension P f of mPf satises SP fS1:
Assume S mPf S1: By (se.1) in Denition 7, any strict extension P f of mPf satises
SP fS1:
We have already shown that SP fS1 and S1 TPf S 0: If S1 mPf S 0; by (se.1) in Denition
7, S1P fS 0; in which case, SP fS 0: If S1 mPf S
0; we repeat the argument above replacing the
former role of S by S1. Since APf is nite, there exists a nite sequence fS1; :::; Skg such
that SP fS1P f    P fSkP fS 0: By transitivity of P f , SP fS 0: 
Lemma 4 Let Pf be a preference relation on 2W . Then, Pf is a strict extension of the
minimal binary relation mPf .
Proof We consider separately the three cases in Denition 7. For the rst two, let
S1; S2 2 APf be such that S1 6= S2:
(se.1) Assume S1 mPf S2: By Lemma 2, S1 Pf S2; i.e., S1 = Ch (S1 [ S2; Pf ) : Since
S1 6= S2; S1PfS2:
(se.2) Assume S2  S1. To obtain a contradiction, assume S2PfS1. Then, S1 6= Ch (S1 [ S2; Pf ) =
Ch (S1; Pf ), where the equality follows because S2  S1: But this is a contradiction with
S1 2 Af :
(se.3) Let S =2 APf :We want to show that there exists S^ 2 APf such that S^ ( S and S^PfS:
Note that Ch (S; Pf ) 2 APf and Ch(S; Pf )  S. Since S =2 APf ; Ch(S; Pf )PfS: Thus, set
the desired S^ be equal to Ch(S; Pf ): Then, S^PfS: 
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4.4 Results
We are now ready to state and prove the two results of this section.
Theorem 2 Let Pf be a preference relation on 2W and assume P f is a strict extension
of the minimal binary relation mPf . Then, AP f = APf and P f=Pf :
Before proving Theorem 2 two remarks are in order. First, the statement of Theorem 2
implicitly contains the following procedure that we want to make explicit before we proceed
to its proof. Given a preference relation Pf on 2W , construct the family APf of individually
rational subsets of workers relative to Pf . From APf , obtain sequentially the binary relation
Pf on APf , its transitive closure TPf , and the minimal binary relation mPf . Then, take
an arbitrary strict extension P f of mPf , construct the family AP f and its associated binary
relation P f . Theorem 2 says that APf = AP f and Pf=P f hold. Second, Theorem 2
implies (together with Theorem 1) that the minimal binary relation can be used as the
representative of all preference relations that leave the set of Core matchings invariant;
namely, mPf still contains all information needed to obtain the full equivalence class of
preference relations as strict extensions of mPf :
We now turn to prove Theorem 2.
Proof We rst prove that AP f = APf : To show that AP f  APf ; we will show that
S =2 APf implies S =2 AP f . Assume S =2 APf . Hence, and since P f is a strict extension of
mPf ; by (se.3), there exists S^ 2 APf such that S^ ( S and S^P fS: Thus, S 6= Ch(S; P f ) and
S =2 AP f .
To show that APf  AP f ; assume S 2 APfnAP f . Hence,
S = Ch(S; Pf ) (8)
and S 6= Ch(S; P f ): Let S 0 ( S be such that S 0 = Ch(S; P f ): Obviously, S 0 = Ch(S 0; P f )
and
S 0P fS: (9)
Thus, S 0 2 AP f . Hence, and since we have already proved that AP f  APf ; S 0 2 APf : Thus,
S 0 = Ch(S 0; Pf ): By S 0  S and (8), S = Ch(S [S 0; Pf ): Hence, S Pf S 0: Thus, S TPf S 0.
By Lemma 3, SP fS 0; a contradiction with (9).
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Second, to prove P f=Pf we will show that for all S1; S2 2 AP f = APf ,
S1 = Ch
 
S1 [ S2; P f

if and only if S1 = Ch (S1 [ S2; Pf ) :
=)) Assume S1 6= Ch (S1 [ S2; Pf ) : Hence, Ch (S1 [ S2; Pf ) Pf S1: By denition of
TPf , Ch(S1[S2; Pf ) TPf S1. By Lemma 3, Ch (S1 [ S2; Pf )P fS1. Since Ch (S1 [ S2; Pf ) 
S1 [ S2, S1 6= Ch
 
S1 [ S2; P f

:
(=) To obtain a contradiction, assume S1 = Ch (S1 [ S2; Pf ) and S1 6= Ch
 
S1 [ S2; P f

:
Then, Ch
 
S1 [ S2; P f
 P f S1: Since Ch(S1[S2; P f )  S1[S2 and S1 = Ch(S1[S2; Pf );
S1 Pf Ch
 
S1 [ S2; P f

: By denition of TPf ; S1 TPf Ch(S1 [ S2; P f ): By Lemma 3,
S1P fCh
 
S1 [ S2; P f

; a contradiction with Ch
 
S1 [ S2; P f
 P f S1: 
Theorem 3 below states that mPf is indeed minimal in the sense that any strictly weaker
binary relation generates, as one of its strict extensions, a preference relation of rm f that
belongs to a di¤erent equivalence class of the one to which Pf belongs to and thus, with a
di¤erent Core for some subprole P f .
Theorem 3 Let Pf be a preference relation and assume b  mPf . Then, there exists a
strict extension bPf of b such that  bPf 6=Pf :
Proof Since b  mPf , there exist S1; S2 2 APf such that S1 mPf S2; but S1bS2: By
(mi) in Denition 6, S1 mPf S2; implies that neither S1 ) S2 nor S2 ) S1: Let bPf be a
strict extension of b with the property that S2 bPfS1: Observe that none of the hypothesis
of conditions (se.1), (se.2), and (se.3) in Denition 7 hold; thus, there exists such extensionbPf . Then, S1 6= Ch(S1 [ S2; bPf ): Hence, mPfPf and S1 mPf S2 imply that, by Lemma
2, S1 Pf S2; namely, S1 = Ch (S1 [ S2; Pf ) : Thus, Pf 6= bPf : 
5 Final Remarks
We nish the paper with four remarks.
First, our approach has focused only on preference relations of rms. Hence, one may
ask whether a symmetric analysis could be performed from the point of view of the workers.
The answer is yes, although the analysis is trivial. Given a preference relation of a worker,
we could similarly construct its corresponding binary relation on the set of acceptable
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rms. However, this binary relation on the set of acceptable rms coincides with the initial
complete preference relation (on the set of acceptable rms) since the best rm of the union
of two di¤erent rms is always equal to the best of the two rms. Thus, from the point of
view of the workerspreference relations all orderings (between pairs of acceptable rms)
are relevant for the set of Core matchings. This is the reason why preference relations of
workers have remained xed while we identied equivalence classes of preference relations
of rms.
Second, an analogous literature in multi-unit auctions has evolved during the last years
wondering about the complexity for bidders of revealing their valuations of all subsets of
objects (see for instance Milgrom (2009)). However, this literature applies to settings where
bidders have cardinal preference relations on objects and/or subsets of objects. Then, bids
are related to valuations on those. In contrast here, as in a large literature on two-sided
matching models, we consider agents with ordinal preference relations.
Third, our results extend to the same partial orders in many-to-many matching markets
since the proofs of Theorems 1, 2 and 3 can be translated straightforwardly to the setting
where preferences of workers are dened on 2F instead of F [f?g and matchings are many-
to-many instead of many-to-one. Then our analysis can also be used to identify equivalence
classes of preference relations of workers (on all subsets of rms) leaving invariant the set
of Core matchings.
Fourth, we preliminarily address the computational aspect of our approach.9 Given
an arbitrary preference relation Pf , to obtain its family of individually rational subset
of workers APf and its minimal binary relation mPf may be a complex task, di¢ cult to
describe by a simple and systematic procedure. However, whenever the preference relation
Pf is substitutable the rst goal becomes easier.10
Assume Pf is substitutable. We ask the following question: is there any simple and
systematic procedure to compute the family of individually rational subsets of workers
9What follows has to be seen as a rst step towards a more general and systematic analysis that is left
for future research.
10Although restrictive, we think that our analysis still has interest because substitutability is a plausible
restriction in settings where workers exhibit low complementarities in shaping rmspreference relations on
2W ; this is the reason why a very large proportion of the literature on ordinal many-to-one matching models
assumes that rms have substitutable preference relations or even stronger conditions like responsiveness.
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APf? We answer the question a¢ rmatively by dening an algorithm that computes APf .
Algorithm
Input: A substitutable preference relation Pf on 2W :
Initialization: Set T0 = 2W and A0 = ;:
Step 1: Given T0 6= ; and A0 obtain S = Ch (W;Pf ). Dene the families of subsets of
workers
T1 = T0nfT 2 T0 j either S ( T  W or T  Sg
and
A1 = A0 [ fT 2 2W j T  Sg:
If T1 = ; stop and let A1 be the outcome of the algorithm; otherwise go to Step 2.
Step k: Given Tk 1 6= ; and Ak 1, take S 0 2 Tk 1 with the property that #S 0  #S 00 for
all S 00 2 Tk 1 and obtain S = Ch (S 0; Pf ) : Dene the families of subsets of workers
Tk = Tk 1nfT 2 Tk 1 j either S ( T  S 0 or T  Sg
and
Ak = Ak 1 [ fT 2 2W j T  Sg:
If Tk = ; stop and let Ak be the outcome of the algorithm; otherwise go to Step k + 1.
Observe that the algorithm can be understood as a set of simple and precise instructions
given to the rm to compute APf : Although it takes as input the preference relation Pf
on 2W , it tries to minimize the number of times that the rm has to be asked about how
it orders pairs of subsets of workers and it only requires that the rm has three abilities.
Given any subset of workers, the rm is able to calculate its cardinality, to compute its
subsets, and to identify its most preferred subset.
The algorithm has several executions depending on the particular subsets S 0 2 Tk 1
with largest cardinality chosen at each step k > 1, if any. The table below illustrates a
particular execution of the algorithm for the following substitutable preference relation (in
the table we omit brackets and commas when writing subsets of workers; for instance, w2w3
should be read as fw2; w3g):
Pf : fw1; w2g; fw1g; fw2g; fw1; w3g; fw3g; f?g:
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Step S 0 S Tk Ak
1 w1w2w3 w1w2 fw1w3; w2w3; w3g fw1w2; w1; w2;?g
2 w1w3 w1 fw2w3; w3g fw1w2; w1; w2;?g
3 w2w3 w2 fw3g fw1w2; w1; w2;?g
4 w3 w3 ? fw1w2; w1; w2; w3;?g
Observe that the outcome of this execution is A4 = APf : The next proposition states that,
as long as Pf is substitutable, this is always the case.
Proposition 1 Let Pf be a substitutable preference relation. Then, any execution of the
algorithm terminates in a nite number of steps and its outcome is APf :
Proof Let Pf be a substitutable preference relation. It is immediate to check that,
at any step k > 0 of the algorithm, Tk ( Tk 1. Thus, any execution of the algorithm
terminates after a nite number of steps, denoted by K. Moreover, Ak 1  Ak: We rst
prove that AK  APf : Assume T 2 AK : Then, there exists 0 < k  K and S 0 2 Tk 1
such that T  S = Ch(S 0; Pf ): Hence, by substitutability of Pf ; S = Ch(S; Pf ) and, by
substitutability again, T = Ch(T; Pf ): Thus, T 2 APf : To prove that APf  AK ; assume
T =2 AK : Note that T 2 T0. Let 0 < k  K be the step where T 2 Tk 1 but T =2 Tk: Hence,
there exists S 0 2 Tk 1 such that S = Ch(S 0; Pf ) and either S ( T  S 0 or T  S: If the later
holds then, T 2 Ak which would contradict the hypothesis that T =2 AK since Ak  AK :
Hence, S ( T  S 0 holds. Since S = Ch(S 0; Pf ); by substitutability, S = Ch(T; Pf ) 6= T:
Thus, T =2 APf : 
If Pf is not substitutable the outcome of the algorithm AK is not necessarily equal to
APf : To see that consider the non substitutable preference relation on 2
fw1;w2g
Pf : fw1; w2g; f?g
and take S 0 = fw1; w2g in Step 1. Then, S = fw1; w2g; T1 = f?g; K = 1, and A1 =
ffw1; w2g; fw1g; fw2g; f?gg: But, APf = ffw1; w2g; f?gg: However, if the algorithm is
modied by setting, at each step k  1;
Tk = Tk 1nfT 2 Tk 1 j S  T  S 0g
22
and
Ak = Ak 1 [ S
then, the output of the algorithm AK coincides with APf for any preference relation Pf :
11
Notice that in this case, the execution of the algorithm may require to ask to the rm all
binary comparisons and hence, the algorithm may not represent a computational improve-
ment with respect to directly ask Pf :
Finally, we leave for further research the computational aspect of obtaining the min-
imal binary relation mPf on APf : Preliminary results suggest that, even for the case of
substitutable preference relations, this may not be an easy task.
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